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Abstract— This paper discusses some problems related with the 
current Brazilian electricity market, brings out some dilemmas 
that should be examined in order to implement a more market 
oriented approach, and proposes a new market design to 
overcome these issues. The proposed market design is based on 
the concept of energy right accounts as virtual reservoirs and 
aims at enhancing the flexibility to enable market participants to 
comply with their contracts, while still ensuring the efficient use 
of the energy resources and maintaining the current security 
supply level. In addition, in order to simulate the behavior of the 
market participants in this new framework, an Agent-Based 
Model - ABM where agents use reinforcement Q-Learning is 
developed for the study case. The results show that this new 
market design is suitable to be applied to hydrothermal systems 
having a large share of hydros. 
Index Terms - Electricity supply industry deregulation, 
Hydroelectric power generation, Multi-agent systems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several electricity market structures have evolved to 
ensure free access, guarantee fair competition, foster higher 
efficiency, and decrease price, while maintaining or improving 
reliability of operation and security of supply. Although Brazil 
made significantly progresses towards liberalization, its 
electricity market has certain particularities that contribute to 
distinguish it from other markets. With a continental 
interconnected transmission system, a large and growing 
demand, and a total installed generation capacity around 137 
GW [1], from which around 70% comes from hydropower 
plants with multiple owners coexisting in hydro cascades, this 
electricity market has gone through two large institutional and 
regulatory reforms in the last twenty years. Currently, it 
contains special processes, mechanisms and instruments to 
handle the mentioned peculiarities. 
Hydro companies usually participate in national public 
auctions with descending price in order to sign long-term 
contracts (usually up to 35 years) to build and operate power 
plants. This electricity purchase occurs in terms of a single 
buyer model, in the scope of which PPAs - Power Purchase 
Agreements are signed between generators and distribution 
companies. After closing a contract and when the power plant 
becomes commissioned, market participants can perform a 
seasonal adjustment of the contracted energy and of the 
physical guarantee. The physical guarantee corresponds to the 
maximum energy production that can be maintained almost 
continuously over the years. It is defined by the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy and it corresponds to a certificate that 
determines the total amount of energy that can be traded in the 
Brazilian electricity market. 
Regarding the seasonal adjustment, generation companies 
are allowed once a year to perform the “seasonalization” 
process, i.e. to set the monthly amount of the annual 
contracted energy and the monthly amount of the physical 
guarantee. Herewith, there is an annual “window” to define 
these amounts. However, the dispatch of the power plants in 
Brazil is carried out in a centralized way by ONS, the 
Brazilian Independent System Operator - ISO, which doesn’t 
consider the mentioned signed contracts when dispatching 
generation units. The ISO’s dispatch goal is to minimize the 
total operating cost, and this is done considering, among other 
issues, future scenarios of water inflows and using a software 
package driven by a minimal cost dispatch approach. 
In this scheme, generators are not allowed to decide their 
own physical generation in order to comply with their 
contracts since there is not a bid based market, and the ISO 
decides their outputs without considering their commercial 
commitments. Thus, if they are not dispatched, they can be 
exposed to the risk of having to buy electricity at volatile 
short-term market prices to complete the energy committed in 
their signed contracts. Because of that, it was implemented a 
mechanism to share the aforementioned risk among hydros. 
This mechanism is known as MRE – Mechanism for Energy 
Reallocation. Shortly, the MRE reallocates energy, transferring 
the surplus generated from those that produce beyond their 
monthly allocated physical guarantee to those that produce 
below. The MRE is automatically performed, and there is no 
flexibility for hydros to address their exposition risk according 
to their own risk perception and strategy. 
The short-term market (known as MCP) then takes place 
after the ISO’s dispatch. Unlike other markets, the Brazilian 
short-term market is not a marketplace where generators are 
active through a self-dispatch procedure, or generators 
influence, through their bids, the dispatch schedule. 
Ultimately, it is not an environment where market participants 
can engage in short-term trades on behalf of their own 
account, as there is no short-term declaration of intent. 
Moreover, the short-term market price (known as Price for 
Settlement of Differences or PLD for short) is not a result 
from the market participant’s interaction, but it is one of the 
outputs of the software package that is run by the ISO. So, the 
MCP, rather than a market, is a mechanism to settle 
differences (i.e., exposed positions) between the amounts of 
electricity committed by contracts and those amounts of 
electricity that each agent ends up providing / receiving. These 
differences must be automatically purchased or sold in the 
MCP and are valued using the PLD price. Lastly, having in 
mind these characteristics, the following problems of this 
market design are recognized and should be addressed: 
• The conciliation between the commercial commitments 
and the physical dispatch is not smooth: there is a lack of 
“trading opportunities” to encourage participants to 
comply with their contracts (namely related with the 
unique annual “window” of the seasonalization process) 
and there is no flexibility for hydros to address their 
exposition risk according to their own risk perception 
and market strategy (since the MRE mechanism is 
automatically activated); 
• The Brazilian short-term market acts as a mechanism to 
settle differences rather than a true market, and neither 
short-term price nor the dispatch schedule is influenced 
by the market; and 
• Inconsistencies regarding the software package code, a 
centerpiece of this market design, may cause a huge 
impact on the electricity sector, affecting the confidence 
of the market agents. 
As can be observed, the current market design poses 
relevant issues concerning the proper functioning of an 
electricity market. In other to overcome these problems it is 
proposed in this paper a new market design aiming at 
enhancing the flexibility of market agents to comply with their 
commercial commitments while maintaining the optimized 
operation of the entire system. According to these ideas, this 
paper is organized as follows. Section II details the dilemmas 
associated with the current market structure in Brazil, Section 
III explains the proposed virtual reservoir based design, 
Section IV describes the implemented ABM (Agent Based 
Model) simulation approach, Section V presents the results 
obtained and Section VI outlines the main conclusions. 
II. TRACKING A SOLUTION 
A solution typically adopted in other electricity markets is 
the employment of a more market-oriented approach. This 
market approach would enable generators to bid, in the short-
term, quantities and prices, which could be used to set the 
market positions and to substitute the seasonalization process 
and the MRE. As a result, the short-term market price would 
be based on the interaction between market participants. 
Nevertheless, there are some dilemmas to be faced, especially 
if considering a power system with a large share of hydros. 
Theses dilemmas are briefly addressed in the next paragraphs. 
A. Dilemma 1: Efficiency of Energy Resources 
Putting into perspective the dichotomy between a 
centralized dispatch (based on the cost merit order) and a 
decentralized one (based on a market approach), it becomes 
clear how important it is to coordinate the use of the water 
stored in the reservoirs in order to safeguard the efficiency of 
using the energy resources while taking advantage of the all 
potential stored energy as discussed in [2]. 
A decentralized dispatch, e.g. a scheme of bids in a market 
pool, can be essentially an instantaneous process and the inter-
temporal features of river chain operations will not be entirely 
captured if a pure single-period market clearing mechanism is 
adopted. Moreover, the presence of several owners in the 
hydro cascades, which is the case of Brazil, endorses a market 
design based on a centralized dispatch. 
B. Dilemma 2: Security of Supply 
The Brazilian short-term market exists for about fifteen 
years. For the time being, the PLD has an average value of 
37.72 €/MWh, and the hydro average successful bid price 
from the national public auctions is 38.16 €/MWh [3]. The 
proximity of both values suggests that the short-term market 
can provide enough incentives to induce adequate investment 
to build new power plants. Nevertheless, the PLD standard 
deviation of the entire set of data is around 55.36 €/MWh. 
With an average of 37.72 €/MWh, this standard deviation 
imposes a huge risk to the health of the business, especially 
regarding cash flow stability. 
Accordingly, it is advocated the need to have a capacity 
mechanism to provide enough incentives to ensure the security 
of supply. Nowadays, this concern is addressed both via the 
contracting scheme where the demand must be fully ex-ante 
contracted and contracts physically backed, and via the ISO 
dispatch, either through the mechanism of risk aversion 
implemented into the software package or through a dispatch 
out of the merit order authorized by CMSE, the federal entity 
that monitors the supply adequacy in the country. 
C. Dillemma 3: Flexibility to Comply with Contracts 
If in one hand a market design having an ISO central 
dispatch is to be kept, on the other hand: 
• there is one unique “window” to define the amount of the 
physical guarantee that will uphold the contracts and 
generators operate their power plants just following the 
amount of production defined by the ISO; 
• the mechanism to share the short-term risk exposition 
(MRE) is automatically performed, which imposes a kind 
of “strait jacket” on the market participants. 
Every time there is a water shortage, the PLD increases, 
there are more dispatched thermal stations and less hydro. 
Depending on the amount of thermal dispatch, hydros can be 
displaced in such a way that MRE will not have the extra 
energy to be shared among its participants. When this occurs, 
an adjustment factor is applied to withdraw a fraction from 
their seasonalized physical guarantee. Extending this 
reasoning to long periods of water scarcity, this represents a 
significant negative exposed position for hydros. In this case, 
the MRE is not able to cover the risk of generators that have to 
buy electricity in the short-term market to complete the energy 
committed in their contracts. 
If each hydro would decide its own production, the 
reservoir management would be on their own. However, in the 
Brazilian case, the decisions regarding each production level, 
and consequently the amount of energy to be stored in the 
reservoirs are taken by a third party, the ISO. Nonetheless, 
water shortage risk is assumed by hydros, once the MRE 
doesn’t cover it. It would therefore be more consistent to 
follow [4]: to structure the framework of incentives such that 
risks are allocated to those who take the decisions and who 
hold the responsibility for taking them into account. 
III. A NEW MARKET DESIGN 
Focused on improving the flexibility to enable market 
participants to comply with their contracts, while still ensuring 
the efficient use of the energy resources and maintaining the 
current security of supply level, a new market design will now 
be proposed. Based on the concept of energy right accounts as 
virtual reservoirs, in this new design each hydro is modeled as 
an agent that has a virtual reservoir representing how much 
energy is virtually stored in his hydro plant. Hereafter, for 
each accounting period, each account is fed by the fraction of 
the total natural affluent energy that flowed to the hydro 
cascade proportional to the hydro’s physical guarantee. Then, 
the following sequence of events is adopted: 
1) The system operator continues his work as it is 
currently done (running the software package, as well 
as other procedures and schemes), and defines the 
amount of generation for each power plant. This 
means that it maintains its responsibility in terms of 
defining the physical dispatch optimizing the use of 
the resources, dispatching the hydro and thermal units; 
2) The “remaining demand” is obtained for each dispatch 
period. This remaining demand is equal to the total 
demand minus the total dispatch allocated to the 
thermal power plants. This difference is the total 
demand to be supplied by hydros; 
3) A bid based hydro short-term market is established for 
the remaining demand. In this market, hydros have the 
opportunity to withstand their bilateral commercial 
commitments while trying to make successful bids. 
The result of this market is a virtual dispatch with 
financial settlement purposes. To do that, hydro agents 
can offer bids considering a price between zero and a 
ceiling price defined by the regulatory agency and a 
quantity available within his account; 
4) The final short-term price is calculated as a weighted 
average considering the most expensive successful 
hydro price bid and the variable cost of the last non-
hydro resource dispatched by the ISO. 
In this new market design two worlds would coexist: the 
real one, associated with the power system considering 
physical effects, and where the ISO runs the dispatch in a 
centralized way; and the virtual one, related to the settlement 
system and with commercial effects, and where hydro agents 
participate in a short-term market. Both worlds simultaneously 
operate, and the link between them is the total affluent natural 
energy that flowed along the hydro cascade in each accounting 
period. At last, the settlement process will occur considering 
the successful quantity bid of each participant, and the 
exposed position will be valued by the new final short-term 
price, which comes from the combination of thermal costs 
based on the ISO dispatch and the short-term price arising 
from the hydro short-term market.  
IV. SIMULATION OF THE NEW MARKET 
To simulate the behavior of the hydropower plants in this 
market design, an Agent-Based Model - ABM was developed 
using reinforcement Q-Learning. According to [5], among the 
modeling alternatives for bidding strategy analysis in the 
electricity short-term markets, ABM is highlighted because it 
allows designing complex electricity markets as collections of 
rule-based agents interacting with one another dynamically 
and intelligently, simulating human beings’ behavior to build 
optimal bidding strategies. Generally, the ABM procedure can 
be described as follows [6]: (1) define the research questions 
to be addressed; (2) construct a model comprising an initial 
population of agents; (3) specify the initial model state by 
defining the agents attributes and the structural and 
institutional framework of the electricity market within which 
the agents operate; (4) make the model evolve over time 
without further intervention; (5) analyze simulation results and 
evaluate the observed regularities. 
In this research, agents represent hydro companies that 
prepare their bids depending on the level of their (virtual) 
reservoirs, the hydro short-term market ceiling price and 
month of the year, which is associated with the water inflows 
into the hydro cascade and the demand to be supplied by 
hydros. Their goal is to manage their reservoir level in order to 
maximize their profit. Agents learn how to act optimally 
through the Q-learning algorithm, which is one of the most 
adopted reinforcement machine learning techniques and 
focuses on the impacts of rewards and punishments on the 
choices of the agents seeking their goal. 
An agent using Q-learning is a goal-oriented learner that, 
for a giving Markov decision process, continually interacts 
with his environment, receives feedback (rewards or 
punishments) from it, and searches for the most profitable 
action considering the past experience. In other words, at each 
time step t the agent is in some state st, chooses any action at 
that is available in state st, receives a corresponding reward rt, 
and moves into a new state st+1. Thus, in Q-learning it is 
imperative to carefully structure the set of states S = {s1, s2, … 
, sn}, actions A = {a1, a2, … , an} and rewards rt(st, at). Lastly, 
the capability of learning to act optimally in Markovian 
domains by experiencing the consequences of actions is given 
by a quality function Q(st, at). This function provides the 
expected utility of taking a given action in a given state [7], 
and it is given by (1). 
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α.{rt(st, at) + γ.maxaQ(st+1, a) - Q(st, at)} (1) 
So, for each admissible pair (s, a), the quality function is 
defined as the Q value. The parameter α is the learning rate, 
which reflects the degree to which recently learned 
information will override the old one (α equal to 0 will make 
the agent not learn, while equal to 1 will induce the agent to 
consider only the most recent information), and the parameter 
γ entitles the discount factor that determines the importance of 
future reinforcements (γ equal to 0 will make the agent 
myopic by only considering current rewards, while values 
closer to 1 turn distant rewards more important). Additionally, 
the expression maxaQ(st+1, a) represents the best the agent 
thinks it can do in state st+1. 
In order to adequately balance the capacity not to converge 
to local optima and the acceleration of the learning process, a 
Simulated Annealing (SA) mechanism is included into the 
developed algorithm as detailed in [8]. An overview of the 
entire algorithm is provided in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Overview of the developed algorithm. 
In brief, to simulate the new market rules the algorithm 
gets from the ISO physical dispatch procedure the total 
demand to be supplied by non-hydros (Qnh) and by hydros 
(Qh), and the variable cost of the last non-hydro dispatched 
unit (PLDnh). It also requires information about ex-ante 
bilateral contracts (qCEt) for each account period t, i.e. the 
amount of energy that must be endured in the hydro short-term 
market by the bids. Other input data is as follows: the natural 
affluent energy that flowed in period t to the hydro cascade 
(NAEt), from which a fraction is allocated to each hydro 
giving their physical guarantee (PG); the reservoir capacity 
(RC), and the virtual reservoir level or energy right account 
(ERAt) in its initial stage. 
The hydro short-term market takes place considering the 
remaining demand Qh, and bids can be done once respected 
the following constraints: the quantity bid (qBID) is limited by 
the ERA balance in each period t, and the price bid (pBID) is 
limited by a maximum regulatory price (pBID_uplimt). The 
bids are sorted considering the pBIDs, the successful bids are 
then identified, and the ERA updated. The clearing price rule 
is adopted to define the final price of the hydro short-term 
market (PLDh), and the final short-term price (PLDfinal) is 
determined by (2) as the weighted average of variable cost of 
the last thermal dispatched unit and the price of the short-term 
hydro based market. 
PLDfinal = (PLDh.Qh + PLDnh.Qnh)/(Qh + Qnh) (2) 
The agents then make two bids. The first bid (BID1) 
addresses the need to comply with bilateral contracts. So, in 
this simulation and regarding BID1 agents are required to 
offer either the exact amount in the bilateral contract (if ERAt 
≥ qCEt) or the maximum available amount in order to mitigate 
the exposed position (if ERAt < qCEt). The second bid (BID2) 
aims at allowing the agents to manage their reservoirs in order 
to optimize the leftover stored energy. That is, agents would 
be allowed to get extra profit in the short-term market when 
there is more energy in the reservoir than the one need to 
comply with the bilateral ex-ante contracts. The Q-learning is 
then structured focusing on the hydros’ flexibility to manage 
this leftover energy (i.e. BID2). 
The state space of the Q-learning is organized in twelve 
states, one for each month of the year. Moreover, it is possible 
to select among twenty-seven different bids (actions), each 
one formed by a pair (qBID, pBID). The action space is 
formed by qBIDs equal to 0% (a1 and a2), 20% (from a3 to 
a7), 40% (from a8 to a12), 60% (from a13 to a17), 80% (from 
a18 to a22) and 100% (from a23 to a27) of the ERAaBID1. 
ERAaBID1 is the available energy in the virtual reservoir after 
the first bid (BID1). The pBID can be 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 
100% of the maximum allowed price bid for the account 
period (pBID_uplimt). Both the state and action space are 
illustrated in Table I, which corresponds to the Q-learning 
matrix.  
TABLE I.  ILLSTRATION OF THE Q-LEARNING MATRIX 
St
at
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 January s1              
… …              
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    a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 … a23 a24 a25 a26 a27
pBID  (% of the 
pBID uplimt)  =
0   
%
100
%
0  
%
25 
%
50  
% 
75  
% 
100 
% … 
0   
% 
25 
% 
50  
% 
75  
% 
100 
% 
             qBID  = 0 20% . ERAaBID1 … 100% . ERAaBID1 
   Actions  
 
Finally, the reward is calculated using equation (3). 
rewardt = factorgoalt * (qBID2suct – ERAaBID2t) * PLDfinalt      (3) 
The factorgoalt is the adjustment factor concerning the 
reservoir level goals, qBID2suct is the successful quantity 
BID2, and ERAaBID2t is the leftover energy in the reservoir 
after BID2 in period t. The value of the factorgoalt is obtained 
by a linear programming problem that runs the same two years 
in a row and aims at avoiding spillage and maximizing profits 
on the hydro short-term market, taking into account the qCEt 
and pBID_uplimt. For the first year of data, this optimization 
outputs the goal level of each reservoir in each month. The 
factorgoalt is equal to 1 if the actual level of the reservoir is 
within a range where the median is the goal level, and it 
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gradually reduces to 0.9, 0.7, 0.4 and zero as the current level 
of the reservoir moves away from the goal range. 
Regarding the reward equation, the following should be 
detailed. There are periods (close to the start period of low 
water flows) when it is better to save water. In this case, it is 
expected low qBID2suct, which results in high ERAaBID2t. 
Therefore, agents should value the ERAaBID2t more than 
qBID2suct. Nevertheless, in certain occasions (e.g. when there 
is water scarcity and prices are high) the best action is to offer 
high qBID2suct  (at a high price), decreasing the level of the 
ERAaBID2t. The decision whether to price either the 
qBID2suct or ERAaBID2t in a given period is guided by the 
factorgoalt. If the agent offers a high qBID when it should be 
low, the current level of the reservoir will be away from the 
goal level, and the reward will penalize the agent through the 
factorgoalt. Ultimately, the PLDfinalt  in equation (3) will boost 
the learning agent, reinforcing the periods of high or low price 
(i.e. low or high water inflow). 
V. RESULTS 
The described market design and its flexibility to address 
the physical dispatch and commercial commitments was tested 
considering a case study that includes four hydro power plants 
with the characteristics in Table II. In this example, hydros 
compete to supply a demand Qh that varies along the 
simulation period and their aim is to extra profit by selling 
their leftover energy in the short-term. Since in Brazil the 
settlement process occurs monthly, the current version of the 
hydro short-term market also operates on a monthly basis. 
TABLE II.  CHARACTERISTIC OF THE HYDROS (MWAVERAGE) 
Hydro H1 H2 H3 H4 
Physical guarantee (PG) 125 100 50 225 
Reservoir capacity (RC) 500 400 200 900 
ERA in t =1 0 0 0 0 
 
The simulation of the system considers three different 
weather patterns (year with high, medium and low water 
inflows) and market conditions (level of ex-ante contract – 
qCE equal to 100%, 50% and 0% of the physical guarantee). 
Two types of ceiling price rules are performed: one where the 
ceiling price is equal to the variable cost of the last non-hydro 
resources dispatched by the ISO in each month (PLDnh); and 
another where the ceiling price is Fixed at 827 $/MWaverage. 
In Table III we can observe the monthly demand and the 
dispatch data. As typically more than 80% of the demand in 
Brazil is supplied by generation coming from hydro power 
plants, the data in this table illustrates this pattern. 
Furthermore, the seasonalization of the bilateral contracts is 
modeled bearing in mind that the annual amount of the 
contracted energy is allocated considering weights determined 
by the natural affluent energy that flowed to the cascade. 
With the aim of covering all conditions described above, 
we considered 18 scenarios. The algorithm converges in 
average after simulating 7,700 years and considering a 
tolerance of 0.5% on the values of the Q-learning matrix built 
in a given iteration regarding the matrix of the previous one. 
Table IV details the scenarios and presents the results 
regarding the factorgoalt and the annual average PLD for Hydro 
4 (the largest reservoir). 
TABLE III.  DEMAND AND DISPACH DATA THROUGHOUT THE YEAR 
(MWAVERAGE OR $/MWAVERAGE) 
 Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Qtotal 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
PLDnh 217 117 117 57 57 57 117 117 317 417 517 617
High 
water 
flow 
Qnh 167 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Qh 333 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495
NAEtotal 333 666 1.166 1.833 1.666 833 666 167 167 0 0 0 
Medium 
water 
flow 
Qnh 250 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 250
Qh 250 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 250
NAEtotal 267 533 933 1.466 1.333 667 533 133 133 0 0 0 
Low 
water 
flow 
Qnh 300 100 5 5 5 5 5 5 200 300 300 300
Qh 200 400 495 495 495 495 495 495 300 200 200 200
NAEtotal 200 400 700 1.100 1.000 500 400 100 100 0 0 0 
 
TABLE IV.  ACHIEVEMENT OF RESERVOIR LEVEL TARGETS FOR HYDRO 4 
AND THE ANNUAL AVERAGE PLD 
Scenarios Factorgoalt  
PL
D
h a
ve
ra
ge
 
W
at
e
r 
flo
w
 Ceiling 
price 
rule 
qCE 
level nº
State  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
high 
PLDnh
100%
1 1 0.9 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0 1 142
medium 7 1 1 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.9 1 162
low 13 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 1 172
high 
50% 
2 1 1 0 0 0.7 1 0.9 0.4 0 0 0 1 151
medium 8 1 1 0.4 0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0 0 1 171
low 14 1 1 1 0.9 0.7 1 1 0.7 0 0 0 0.7 185
high 
0% 
3 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.9 0.7 0 0 0 0 1 185
medium 9 1 1 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 192
low 15 1 1 0 0 0.9 1 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 0.7 201
high 
Fixed
100%
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 374
medium 10 1 1 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 258
low 16 1 1 1 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.9 1 1 345
high 
50% 
5 0.9 0.9 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.7 1 0.9 0.7 0.7 500
medium 11 1 1 0.7 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 500
low 17 1 1 0.9 0.4 0 0 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 517
high 
0% 
6 1 0.7 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 1 1 0.9 0.9 1 551
medium 12 0.9 1 0.4 0 0 0.7 0.7 1 0.7 0.7 0.9 1 655
low 18 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.7 672
 
A. The quantity bid behavior 
As mentioned before, the factorgoalt is obtained by a linear 
optimization and it reflects the achievement of reservoir level 
targets. This linear programming establishes this targets taking 
into account that agents are free to define their successful 
quantity bid (qBID2suct). So, as it can be seen in Figure 2, the 
target scheme from the linear programming output guide the 
agent to: (i) decrease his reservoir level (offering high 
qBID2s) until month 3 in order to minimize a possible spillage 
once the beginning of the year is a period with high rainfall 
(i.e. high deposits – DEP into the ERA); (ii) recover the 
reservoir level (offering very low qBID2s) in the following 
months (4, 5, 6 and 7); (iii) sustain the reservoir at a high level 
during months 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 (qBID2s equal to zero); and 
(iv) offer all the stored energy in the month of higher price 
(i.e. month 12). 
 
Figure 2.  Hydro 4 in scenario 1: DEP, reservoir levels target and actual 
reservoir levels in each month 
Nevertheless, as indicate by the shaded cells in Table IV 
and in Figure 2, the monthly reservoir level does not end 
exactly that way. Because all the agents operate over the same 
goal-oriented scheme, in the beginning of the learning process 
they tend to offer everything they can in month 12. But once 
there is competition, the bid quantities are larger than the total 
demand in this month, leading to non-accepted bids. As a 
result, agents adapt to competition and improve their behavior 
offering qBID2 values previously in month 11, 10, 9 and 8, 
where the ceiling price is also at a good level. In the early 
months of the year something similar occurs: all hydros try to 
get rid of the water; competition grows, which decreases the 
value of the planned qBID2suc. Then, the current reservoir 
level ends up larger than the target. 
Thereby, we observe that, while the linear programming 
target scheme suggests the agent a preliminary strategy, the Q-
learning algorithm teaches the agent how to, at the same time, 
follow the targets and deal with the dynamic of the market. 
B. The price bid behavior  
By comparing the annual PLDaverage of each scenario we 
can notice that the price increases either (i) when the annual 
water inflow decreases, (ii) when there is more leftover stored 
energy available for BID2 due to less commitment by bilateral 
ex-ante contracts, or (iii) when ceiling price rule moves from 
the PLDnh pattern to the Fixed one. For scenario no. 1 (the one 
with the lowest PLDhaverage), Figure 3 presents the bid prices 
(dots, each color representing a hydro), the monthly water 
inflows (NAE), ceiling prices (pBIDuplim) and the final hydro 
short-term prices. 
 
Figure 3.  Price bids versus ceiling price and NAE in scenario no. 1. 
In economic terms, we should expect an increase of the 
product price when the availability of the resource needed to 
produce it (water inflow) decreases. So, when moving from a 
good hydrological year to a medium or a bad one, the 
electricity short-term price level should rise. As pointed out by 
[9], market power in hydro markets arises from the strategic 
water management of reservoirs. In other words, the 
reallocation of a given amount of energy across periods can 
lead to an increase in market prices. Nevertheless, companies 
acting as price-makers have their market power reduced or 
cancelled when they are forced to be bilateral contracted. This 
price trend can also be seen in this case study. Moving from a 
higher level (100%) of bilateral contracts to a lower one (50% 
and 0%) originates a sharp price rise. Lastly, the used ceiling 
price rule significantly influences the final clearing market 
price, what may suggest, among other things, the exercise of 
market power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The reported results indicate that, after complying with the 
bilateral contracts, agents can manage their reservoirs in order 
to optimize the leftover stored energy. The entire algorithm 
combines a goal-oriented scheme, built through the mentioned 
linear programming, with a goal-oriented learner from the Q-
learning. Through the performed simulation, we can notice 
that both the quantity and the price bid strategy are consistent 
with what is expected in real electricity markets. 
Finally, from a broad perspective, the proposed market 
design maintains the current levels of efficiency and security, 
while increasing the level of flexibility regarding the 
commercial behavior of the agents. In the Brazilian case, this 
flexibility is achieved by replacing the MRE and the 
seasonalization processes by a virtual reservoir model. As a 
consequence, the management of (virtual) reservoirs is under 
the responsibility of each hydro, which could (virtually) save 
water according to their own risk perception. In doing so, the 
operation of the physical system by the ISO is not affected, 
ensuring the efficiency of the hydro cascade operation and 
maintaining the current level of the security of supply. 
REFERENCES 
[1] ANEEL – Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency. Database of 
electricity generation [Online]. Available: http://www.aneel.gov.br 
[2] A. Philpott, Z. Guan, J. Khazaei, G. Zakeri, “Production inefficiency of 
electricity markets with hydro generation,” Utilities Policy, vol. 18, pp. 
174-185, Dec. 2010. 
[3] CCEE - Electric Power Commercialization Chamber. Prices. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ccee.org.br 
[4] IEA - International Energy Agency, Energy market experience: 
Lessons from liberalized electricity markets. Paris: OECD/IEA, 2005. 
[5] Li G., Shi J., Qu X. Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy 
optimization in the liberalized electricity spot market: A state-of-the-art 
review. Energy, vol. 36, pp. 4686-4700, 2011. 
[6] Weidlich, A.; Veit, D. A critical survey of agent-based wholesale 
electricity market models. Energy Economics, 30, pp. 1728-1759, 2008. 
[7] Watkins, C.; Dayan, P. Technical Note: Q-Learning. Machine 
Learning, 8, pp. 279-292, 1992. 
[8] M. Guo; Y. Liu; J. Malec, "A new Q-learning algorithm based on the 
metropolis criterion", IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, Part B, vol. 34, n. 5, pp. 2140-2143, Oct. 2004. 
[9] Rangel, L. F. Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated 
electricity markets. Energy Policy 36 (2008) 1292–1302. 
